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 CHAPTER 4 
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Land Commodifi cation: Policy Innovations 
and Rural–Urban Integration in Chengdu 
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 Singapore 
e-mail:  forrestzhang@smu.edu.sg 
 J.  Wu 
 Chengdu University ,  Chengdu ,  People’s Republic of China 
 The provision of public services in rural areas faces three major challenges. 
First, because of their disadvantaged positions in the economic division 
of labor vis-a-vis urban areas, rural areas generally suffer from a short-
age of value-added economic activities that can generate enough fi nancial 
resources for local public authorities to fund the provision of public ser-
vices. Second, the geographically dispersed rural settlement pattern fur-
ther increases both the cost and diffi culty of delivering public services and 
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goods to a spatially spread-out population. Last, everywhere the reliance 
of public services provision on public authorities, which can act as the poli-
cymaker, service provider, or both, creates the problem of accountability 
and agency control. In rural areas, the additional reliance on fi scal transfer 
from outside, which is made necessary by the fi rst condition mentioned 
above, further makes local policymakers and service providers less sensitive 
to local demands and less accountable to local service users, and the prob-
lem of agency control more severe. Together, these three conditions have 
made public services provision to the rural population a highly challeng-
ing task that has rarely been successfully implemented in the developing 
countries of the world (World Bank  2003 ). 
 In the post-Mao Reform era, China’s performance in delivering pub-
lic services to the rural population has not been impressive either (West 
 1997 ). After the fi scal recentralization reform in 1994 and before the rural 
tax reform carried out between 2002 and 2006, rural public services pro-
vision depended heavily on the myriad of taxes and fees collected by local 
authorities from the rural population and rural enterprises. The detrimen-
tal impact of this approach of fi nancing and implementing rural public 
services provision on deteriorating local state–society relationship is now 
widely known. Cash-strapped local governments already had to rely on 
extra-budgetary local fees and surcharges to even pay for the salaries of 
offi cials. Faced with more unfunded central mandates of public services 
provision, such as the nine-year mandatory education program, they had 
to impose increasing burdens of taxes and fees on the rural population, 
creating the infamous ‘peasant burden’ problem, which led to widespread 
resistance from the rural population and frequent violent confrontation 
between them and local governments (Bernstein and Lu  2003 ). 
 The rural tax reform that started in 2002 sought to address this prob-
lem of both lack of fi nancing for services provision and lack of control over 
wayward local agencies with a three-pronged approach (Kennedy  2007 ; 
Li  2007 ). First, the central government implemented a tax-for-fee reform 
that tried to replace the arbitrary fees imposed by local governments with 
formalized and regulated taxes. This reform eventually evolved into the 
abolition of the agricultural tax, which by 2006 has been implemented 
nationwide, and total elimination of the rural population’s tax burden. 
Second, now that local governments had been deprived of their primary 
revenue source, the central government also increased fi scal transfers to 
rural areas to fund both local governments’ operation and welfare pro-
grams for the rural population. Such central fi scal transfers include direct 
subsidies to rural residents, earmarked funds for welfare programs and 
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government projects, and budgetary allocations to local governments. 
Third, to tighten the control over their local agents and ensure local com-
pliance, the central government also implemented a downsizing of local 
bureaucracies and imposed more stringent top-down monitoring and 
evaluation of local government offi cials. 
 Most studies have found that the rural tax reform has succeeded in its 
original goal of reducing the state’s tax extraction from the rural popula-
tion and defusing the increasingly tense relationship between the rural 
population and grassroots government (Chen  2014 ; Kennedy  2007 ; Li 
 2007 ). However, it has also resulted in the unintended consequence of 
further depleting rural public services (Li  2008 ; Luo et al.  2007 ). In the 
fi rst few years after the tax reform, the central fi scal transfers that were 
intended to replace local tax revenues were inadequate to make up for the 
revenue shortage created by the tax reduction. Then, as central transfers 
increased in more recent years (as much as over ten times, from 42 mil-
lion yuan in 2005 to 562 billion yuan in 2008, according to Li [ 2008 ]), 
another problem emerged: The grassroots-level agents that are crucial for 
service delivery, the township-level governments, have been largely deca-
pacitated by the tax reform—fi scally stripped of revenue sources, politi-
cally demoralized, and administratively hollowed out (Kennedy  2007 ; 
Smith  2010 ). Local governments’ tendency toward selectively implement-
ing central policies to serve the political or fi nancial interests of themselves 
and their allies has long been known (O’Brien and Li  1999 ). Now that 
their capacity for both penetrating into rural society to solicit and incorpo-
rate the demands of service users and delivering services to an increasingly 
socially differentiated and geographically mobile rural population has been 
greatly weakened, even if they have the right incentives, it remains highly 
uncertain whether the increased central spending on rural public services 
can really be devoted to services provision and reach the targeted popula-
tion instead of being squandered in wasteful campaigns that only advance 
local offi cials’ interests (Li  2008 , 260). 
 Since 2006, the central government’s investment in rural public spend-
ing has mostly been channeled through the ‘Building a New Socialist 
Countryside’ policy initiative (Looney  2015 ). Of the two main compo-
nents of this policy initiative—welfare provision and village reconstruc-
tion—studies have found that the fi rst one has had greater success (Ahlers 
and Schubert  2009 ; Looney  2015 ). This divergence is mainly because, 
for welfare provision, the central government can directly transfer funds 
into personal accounts (for programs such as the New Rural Cooperative 
Medical Scheme, Minimum Living Allowances Scheme, and Rural Social 
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Pension Scheme) to increase rural populations’ participation in and 
coverage by these programs or directly to county governments to fund 
the expenses of programs such as nine-year compulsory education. But 
for the latter, village reconstruction and the active involvement and effec-
tive implementation by grassroots governments (townships and villages) 
are indispensable. When the implementation of the policy is left to the 
discretion of grassroots governments, whose capacity for effective imple-
mentation is highly in doubt, we again see the familiar pattern of them 
using campaign-style mobilization to create ‘demonstration projects’ to 
win upper-level approval, but often without addressing real demands of 
the local population (Looney  2015 ; Perry  2011 ). 
 While no systematic evaluation of the nationwide implementation of 
the ‘New Socialist Countryside’ policy is yet available, existing case studies 
show that this central policy initiative has not successfully addressed the 
three inherent obstacles in rural public services provision, and as a result, 
its impact in that regard has been limited. The whole program depended 
heavily on central funding, which made it not sustainable when the cen-
tral government’s policy priority shifts. And indeed in recent years under 
the new central leadership of President Xi Jinping, central funding for it 
has declined and its implementation stagnated. The village reconstruction 
projects started under this policy focused mainly on the beautifi cation of 
existing villages rather than the transformation of the rural settlement pat-
tern (Looney  2015 ). The spatial dispersion of the rural population remains 
a challenge for public services delivery. Finally, without re-capacitating 
grassroots governments and enabling public participation, the problem of 
motivating and controlling local agents has persisted. 
 It is in this context that an innovative program in one locality, 
Chengdu, which successfully addressed the three inherent obstacles and 
greatly improved the provision of public services in rural areas, becomes 
particularly interesting for studying policy innovation. There are three key 
innovations in this so-called ‘Chengdu model’: First, leveraging on the 
most important resource in rural area—land, or rather land development 
rights—and through its commodifi cation, creating a fi nancial source that 
can fund public services provision; second, transforming traditional rural 
residential settlement patterns and concentrating the rural population in 
newly built residential communities; and, fi nally, using both market and 
hierarchical tools to both motivate and control grassroots governments 
and creating new institutions to facilitate public participation in services 
delivery. 
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 In the remainder of this chapter, we fi rst introduce both the national 
policy context of land rights and land-use regulations that created the pos-
sibility of land development rights trading and the unique local conditions 
in Chengdu that made such trading a transformative force for Chengdu’s 
rural development. We then detail the local policy innovations that created 
the institutional arrangements and shaped the implementation processes 
and outcomes of Chengdu’s rural reconstruction programs. We also offer 
a preliminary assessment of the impact of Chengdu’s policy innovations. 
Data used in this study come from both primary data collection and sec-
ondary documents obtained from various government bodies. One of the 
authors followed closely the evolution of the experiment in Chengdu from 
2008 onward and was engaged by the municipal government to conduct 
assessment of the implementation and impacts of the program. During the 
past seven years, the two authors, independently and jointly, visited over 
300 villages and conducted over 500 interviews with rural residents and 
local offi cials. We also conducted three rounds of questionnaire survey of 
about 2500 residents in 100 villages. The survey results are not directly 
used in the paper, but they informed our analysis. 
 THE COMMODIFICATION OF LAND DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS 
 Under China’s current land system, rural land is divided into several land- 
use categories, including agricultural land ( nongyongdi ), which is the main 
target of protection of the Land Management Law and contains farm-
land  (gengdi ) as a sub-category within it; family housing construction land 
( zhaijidi ), which is collectively owned and allocated to members of rural 
collectives free of charge as a membership entitlement for constructing 
their own housing; and construction land ( jianshe yongdi ), which is typi-
cally controlled by the village authority and can be used for local public 
facilities, non-farm enterprises, and other non-agricultural uses. 
 The regulatory system of land use in rural China is characterized by two 
central features: farmland preservation and centralized land-use regulation 
(Lin and Ho  2005 ; Xu et al.  2009 ; Wang et al.  2010 ). Farmland preserva-
tion became a policy priority in the late 1990s, when the central govern-
ment became alerted to the steadily declining stock of arable land caused 
by rapid urbanization over the past two decades and perceived farmland 
loss as an unacceptable threat to national food security (Lin and Ho 
 2003 ). Central government passed the Land Management Law in 1998 
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and started to devise a national Land Use Master Plan to put nationwide 
land-use practices under tight central control (Wang et  al.  2010 ). This 
Master Plan sets out a series of targets for various types of land use for the 
next 15 years, including, for example, the amount of farmland to be pre-
served and the amount of agricultural land that can be converted to urban 
use. 1 For each year, an Annual Land Use Plan then breaks down these 
long-term objectives into annual quotas for different types of land use and 
allocates these land-use targets to each province. Starting from provinces 
and down to townships, lower-level governments must then formulate 
and adhere to their respective land-use plans and annual land-use quotas. 
The fi rst and foremost goal for these regulatory measures is farmland pres-
ervation. The most memorable item from the national Master Plan is the 
120 million-hectares ‘red line’ for farmland preservation. This is specifi ed 
as the minimum amount of farmland that China needs to ensure food self- 
suffi ciency and constitutes a bottom line that cannot be crossed. 2 By 2007, 
however, the country’s total amount of farmland has already declined to 
121.7 million ha, leaving little room for further loss (Long et al.  2012 ). 
 Under this context of strict farmland preservation and centralized 
land-use regulation, the central government exercises tight control over 
the conversion of rural land (particularly farmland) into urban uses. This 
makes the ability to use a piece of rural land for urban development—
the land development right, LDR hereafter—a scarce opportunity that is 
highly sought after in the rapidly urbanizing rural China. While rural areas 
all have abundant supply of land, most of the land lacks land development 
right: It cannot be used for urban development without being granted the 
LDR by upper-level governments—by being given either a quota from 
the annual land-use plan or some other ad hoc authorization. Under the 
annual land-use plan, the quotas of LDR are administratively allocated and 
are not tradable across local government units. If the LDR quota becomes 
tradable, however, then some rural areas can trade the valuable LDR quo-
tas they have for fi nancial gains. Two later national policies created this 
possibility of LDR trading. 
 The Emergence of LDR Trading 
 The rapid pace of urbanization in China has created a seemingly insa-
tiable appetite for rural land, which cannot be adequately supplied under 
the existing annual land-use plan. The intensifying confl ict between farm-
land preservation and urban demand for rural land conversion made it 
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 inevitable that the central government had to settle for a compromise in 
the form of a ‘no net loss’ policy regarding farmland preservation, seek-
ing a dynamic balance rather than static preservation. This policy, known 
as  zhan bu ping heng (hereafter, ZBPH)—balancing farmland occupation 
with farmland reclamation—was codifi ed in the 1998 Land Management 
Law (and its 2004 revised version) as the requirement for land users who 
occupy farmland for urban uses to reclaim new farmland of the same 
amount and quality to ensure no net loss of farmland. 
 Under this regulatory framework, in effect since 1998, for all local gov-
ernments from provinces down to townships, when they convert farmland 
to urban uses, even when this is within the Annual Land Use Plan, the 
same amount of new farmland must be reclaimed from other types of land. 
This has therefore created a demand for the reclamation of new farmland; 
some rural areas can then specialize in supplying such new reclamation and 
trade that for fi nancial gains. The only case of LDR trading in China that 
has been studied in the English-language literature was such a program of 
trading ZBPH quotas in Zhejiang (Wang et al.  2010 ; Zhang et al.  2014 ). 
But due to its violation of the central land-use plan, that experiment was 
terminated by the central government in 2009. 
 The central government started to quietly roll out another initiative in 
2004, under a very cautious approach, which further broadened the scope 
of LDR trading in rural China. The new initiative, offi cially described 
as ‘linking up increase in urban construction land with decrease in rural 
construction land’, was fi rst experimented in 2006 in fi ve pilot provinces, 
including Sichuan, where Chengdu is located, and gradually rolled out 
nationwide in the following fi ve years (Long et al.  2012 ). For this policy, 
known in Chinese as  zeng jian gua gou (linking up increase [in urban 
construction land] with decrease [in rural construction land], hereafter 
ZJGG), the object of regulation is no longer farmland, as was the case 
for the ZBPH policy, but construction land. For ZBPH, the policy goal 
is ‘no net loss’ of farmland; for ZJGG, it is ‘ no net gain ’ of construction 
land—and in fact, a net  increase of farmland. More specifi cally, when any 
non-agricultural developments, including urbanization programs in rural 
townships, occupy farmland and result in an increase of urban construc-
tion land, some rural construction land must be reduced, and reclaimed 
into farmland. The ZJGG policy gives these pilot regions a new channel of 
turning farmland into urban uses, in addition to and independent of the 
existing channels regulated by the land-use Mater Plan, annual quotas, 
and practice of ZBPH. 
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 In real practice, this policy shifted local governments’ attention from 
reclaiming new farmland, which can come from a variety of sources such 
as other types of agricultural land, to reducing rural construction land. 
But how to reduce rural construction land? The answer, almost invari-
ably across localities, comes from rural housing land. Nationwide, all rural 
housing land adds up to 9.12 million hectares in 2005 and accounts for 
55 percent of all rural construction land; its size had also increased in the 
ten years prior to the implementation of the ZJGG policy (Song et  al. 
 2008 ). Rural housing land also has huge potentials for reduction. The 
rural settlement pattern results in low land-use density. Furthermore, 
over-construction of houses—for example, multiple houses for one fam-
ily, an illegal but widespread practice—and abandonment of houses, as a 
result of rural depopulation, which has created the widespread problem of 
‘hollowed villages’ (Long et al.  2012 ), increases the ‘wastage’ in the use 
of rural housing land. Reduction of rural construction land can therefore 
come through both reducing existing unused housing land and changing 
rural settlement patterns to further reduce housing land use. 
 The ZJGG policy sets up a framework for the transfer of LDR. The 
locality that turns a piece of land previously used as rural construction 
land into farmland is giving up the development right of that piece of 
land. Under the ZJGG policy, that right can then be transferred, in the 
form of a quota—through either some market mechanisms or administra-
tive allocation—to another locality, which can then use it to ‘develop’ its 
agricultural land. The transfer of LDR under the ZJGG policy is, however, 
further restricted by three requirements. First, the central government 
continues to exercise a tight control over the total scale of all ZJGG proj-
ects through allocating annual quotas to local units. From 2006 to 2010, 
the Ministry of Land and Resources (MLR) only released a total quota 
of 49,000 ha. Second, in its implementation, the two projects of  jian xin 
(building new construction and thus increasing urban construction land) 
and  chai jiu (demolishing old buildings and thus reducing rural construc-
tion land), which are spatially and often temporally separated, must form a 
one-to-one linkage and be approved together as a single project. Last, the 
two linked projects must be within the jurisdiction of the same county- 
level unit, which restricts the scope of LDR transfer within the county 
boundary. 
 These restrictions show the caution that the central government has 
toward the ZJGG experiment. It has never intended it to be a transfor-
mative force in rural development and land-use regulation. In all other 
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localities, the policy has only had localized and minor impact. Only in 
Chengdu, it led to transformative changes. 
 The Chengdu Case: Central Concessions 
 Before the MLR formally started ZJGG experiment in 2006, it selected 
one township in Chengdu—Tangyuan town in Pi County—to conduct a 
pilot study. Then in 2006, when the MLR expanded the experiment to the 
fi ve pilot provinces, the entire municipality of Chengdu became a desig-
nated experiment zone and was given an annual quota of 7000  mu under 
the ZJGG scheme. This meant that, besides the annual quota of farmland 
that can be converted to urban use specifi ed under the national land-use 
Master Plan (50,000  mu ), the ZJGG scheme gave Chengdu an additional 
quota of 7000  mu construction land, a 14 percent increase, most of which 
would require conversion of farmland. This annual quota was increased to 
10,000  mu in 2007. Then, the whole situation changed unexpectedly as a 
result of the 2008 Wenchuan earthquake. 
 On May 12, 2008, a massive earthquake struck Sichuan; the epicenter 
in Wenchuan County was just 70 kilometers from the center of Chengdu. 
The earthquake devastated several counties in Chengdu and created an 
urgent need for a massive reconstruction in the vicinities of Chengdu, 
which could not proceed without greater fl exibility in land use. During his 
visit to the disaster-stricken area on June 22, the then President Hu Jintao 
instructed that Chengdu should use the experimental scheme of ZJGG 
to speed up post-disaster reconstruction. The MLR gave Chengdu the 
green light so that in the following three years, the practice of ZJGG in 
Chengdu would be exempted from the two restrictions of quota control 
and within-county transfer. This gave the Chengdu municipal government 
a blank check for the next three years to create as much new urban con-
struction land as it needed under the ZJGG scheme, a privilege that no 
other local governments had. 
 Besides the policy support, urban development also needs investment. 
Chengdu was again at the right historical juncture. The global fi nancial 
crisis that started in late 2008 accelerated the relocation of manufactur-
ing capacities from China’s land-expansive and labor-scarce coastal area 
to inland provinces. Chengdu, thanks to its lax land-use regulation and 
recently improved infrastructure, became a top destination. Chengdu also 
received an infl ux of inter-provincial aid for post-disaster reconstruction. 
Both these created unprecedented demands for new construction land 
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in Chengdu, which were then met through the emancipated version of 
the ZJGG policy. The result is a re-confi guration of rural space on an 
unprecedented scale: In the three years from June 2008, Chengdu had 
converted a whopping 400,000  mu of farmland to urban use under the 
ZJGG scheme, eight times the allocated annual quota under the national 
Master Plan, and reduced an even larger amount of rural housing land. 
 The special concessions given to Chengdu by the central government 
created three conditions that allowed Chengdu to use the ZJGG policy 
to construct a unique policy program for rural transformation. First, the 
abolition of scale control allowed the municipal government to apply the 
policy to all its subordinate units. Second, allowing the ZJGG quotas to 
be transferred across counties created a market for LDR between the hin-
terland counties which can specialize in the creation of ZJGG quotas and 
peri-urban counties which have more fi nancial resources and can use those 
to buy the ZJGG quotas. It was this fi nancial transfer that occurs together 
with the LDR transfer that provided the much-needed fi nancial resources 
for rural public services provision. Finally, the earthquake and the central 
political concessions also created an imperative of rural reconstruction for 
local governments, which forced them to devote more resources to rural 
public services provision. While these central political concessions have 
now created the favorable conditions for a large-scale reconstruction of 
Chengdu’s rural areas, how resources would be used and how the pro-
gram would proceed still need to be determined by the municipal govern-
ment through setting up the specifi c institutions that shape the practical 
implementation of these policies. 
 LOCAL POLICY INNOVATIONS: LAND COMMODIFICATION, 
RESIDENTIAL RECONSTRUCTION, AND AGENCY CONTROL 
 The Chengdu Municipality consists of 19 county-level units. 3 These 19 
sub-units are differentiated by both geographic location and level of 
urbanization into three layers: (1) the central urban area, which comprises 
fi ve urban districts that are already fully built up and have virtually no agri-
cultural land left; (2) the peri-urban area, which includes six counties that 
immediately surround the urban core and have been facing rising demands 
for urbanization; and (3) eight counties in the hinterland area, which have 
far fewer opportunities for urbanization but a far greater reserve of rural 
construction land. The peri-urban counties and hinterland counties face 
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two sharply different scenarios in land use. The former are the preferred 
locations for urban expansion and new industrial developments and have 
urgent needs for LDR so that they can convert their farmland into urban 
uses. The latter, in contrast, are sending their rural population to urban 
jobs in the central city and per-urban areas and have increasing amounts 
of under-used rural housing land that can be reclaimed into farmland and 
used to create LDR quotas under the ZJGG scheme. The two are also in 
different fi nancial situations: The peri-urban counties have more fi nancial 
resources and can further expand their revenue sources once they obtain 
LDR for their farmland and convert farmland to urban uses; the hinter-
land counties, however, have benefi ted far less from urban growth and face 
a shortage of fi scal resources to fund public services provision. 
 The immovability of land and the spatially uneven nature of economic 
development determine that the benefi ts of urbanization are not equally 
shared by peri-urban and hinterland counties. The ZJGG scheme, when 
it can be applied across counties as in Chengdu’s case, however, has now 
created a mechanism that can potentially redistribute the fi nancial benefi ts 
derived from urban development from peri-urban to hinterland counties 
and provide the latter a fi scal resource. Hinterland counties can special-
ize in the production of LDR quotas (through the reduction of housing 
land use), which they can exchange with peri-urban counties for fi nancial 
returns; by paying hinterland counties for the LDR quotas, peri-urban 
counties are in effect transferring a part of the fi nancial benefi ts they gain 
from urbanization, thanks to their locational advantages, to the hinterland 
counties. 
 For this to happen, however, specifi c local institutions must be set up 
to regulate the production of LDR, the transfer of LDR, and the use of 
fi nancial resources derived from such transfers. By imposing the policy of 
farmland preservation, the central government has created the LDR as a 
scarce resource and forces peri-urban counties to acquire it. But it gives 
no guidance on how LDR quotas are produced, how they are transferred 
once they are produced (through market exchanges or administrative allo-
cations?), or, if fi nancial gains are derived from the transfer, how they 
should be used by local governments. In fact, there are no central regula-
tions that link the LDR transfer to rural public services provision. It is 
only through local policy innovations in Chengdu that the solutions to all 
these questions are determined. As a result, as we will show in detail in the 
following, market institutions were created to enable the trading of LDR 
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quotas as a commodity, the production of LDR quotas was linked to the 
construction of New Rural Communities (NRCs) for concentrated settle-
ment, and fi nally, fi nancial gains from the LDR trading were channeled 
into public services provision in the NRC. This innovative program there-
fore successfully solved the three inherent problems facing public services 
provision in rural areas: The LDR trading created a fi nancial transfer from 
the richer peri-urban counties to the cash-strapped hinterland counties to 
fund their services provision; the construction of NRCs transformed the 
spatial dispersion of rural residential settlement to make services delivery 
more effi cient; and a combination of top-down control and bottom-up 
participation improved agency control. 
 Creating the Market for LDR Trading 
 For the LDR quota to become a commodity tradable between its pro-
ducers and eventual users, a whole set of institutions must be built fi rst 
before this market can emerge. At the two ends of the TDR transaction 
are two very different parties. The original owners of development rights 
over small and scattered pieces of rural housing land are individual rural 
households; the potential end users of such development rights are, how-
ever, mostly urban businesses who need a much bigger area than any sin-
gle rural housing plot. It is highly improbable that any transfer of LDR 
could spontaneously occur between these two parties. Many stumbling 
blocks like this one must be cleared before LDR trading can happen; and 
through innovative and effective institutional building, local governments 
in Chengdu played the role of the market maker for LDR trading. 
 In Chengdu, the whole process of LDR trading involves 11 steps. These 
steps, in their operational sequences, and local governments’ involvement 
at each are detailed below. 
 Step 1: The participation in the LDR trading under the ZJGG scheme 
in Chengdu is a voluntary process. While the unit of participation is the 
village, the process is typically initiated and operated by the county gov-
ernment’s Land and Resource Bureau. County governments in the hin-
terland region would select villages that they consider to have conducive 
conditions for implementing such projects and ask them to apply. Such 
conditions include strength of grassroots leadership, history of petition or 
collective resistance (or the lack thereof) and presence of social cohesion, 
which are all indications that the implementation of the ZJGG project 
will likely be smooth. Because of the complex and competitive nature of 
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applying for ZJGG projects, villages often hired professional companies to 
prepare the application materials. 
 Step 2: The municipal government would review all applications. 
Once a project is approved, the real challenges emerge. Under the ZJGG 
scheme, for a LDR trading to happen, one piece of rural housing land 
would give up its development right and then be reclaimed into farmland; 
this right will then be transferred to another piece of farmland, which 
can then undergo urban development. This means that some rural houses 
must fi rst be demolished and the housing land reclaimed into farmland. 
This presents a host of challenges in real practice. Residents whose houses 
are demolished need places to live. Although there are uninhabited houses 
and unused housing land in rural areas, to reach a meaningful scale, a 
ZJGG project would always involve many inhabited houses. Rural areas 
also have little rental housing stock to provide temporary housing. Only 
one solution is left: constructing new residential housing before demoli-
tion starts. But that raises more questions. Before any de-construction is 
done, where to fi nd additional land for new construction? How to get 
approval for this, which typically involves occupying farmland? How to 
fund it when no LDR has been sold yet? 
 For the whole process to start rolling, there must be a fi rst kick—the 
advancing of fund for a lengthy process that includes housing demolition, 
new construction, and farmland reclamation. Here, the municipal gov-
ernment made a crucial contribution by setting up the Municipal Land 
Reserve, which serves as a LDR bank and gives out interest-free loans to 
townships and villages for starting the approved ZJGG projects. These 
loans will eventually be recouped from the sales of construction land (in 
Step 11), but must be advanced long before that. In recent years, the 
municipal government has tried to attract private capital into playing this 
role, but due to the long delay in repayment (typically three years or lon-
ger) and lack of high returns, there have been few takers. The municipal 
government remains the ‘lender of last resort’. 
 Step 3: Once a ZJGG project is approved and start-up funds advanced 
from the Land Reserve, the township and village governments can then start 
recruiting villagers to participate in the project. A project must reach a cer-
tain scale in its housing land reduction (i.e., the size of the LDR quota) to be 
economically meaningful. In fact, in its application, a project needs to specify 
its intended size, which requires grassroots offi cials to do groundwork in 
surveying villagers for their intentions to participate and come up with an 
estimate. After the approval, township and village offi cials would host mass 
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meetings in villages and conduct door-to-door visits to mobilize support for 
the project and persuade villagers to participate. In most cases, villagers par-
ticipated with enthusiasm. In fact, projects were often over-subscribed and 
participating villagers needed to pay a deposit to hold their places. 
 Step 4: Once enough villagers have signed up and contracts are signed, 
a site for the construction of new housing (the ‘New Rural Communities’, 
NRC) would be selected and the land-use rights for that plot acquired. In 
practice, this is the most challenging step, as it involves not only fi nding 
a new location that is desirable (the overwhelming preference of villag-
ers is proximity to a market town), but also obtaining use rights from its 
original users, which can be villagers in other villages. One solution is land 
swap, but the most widely adopted approach is paying cash compensation 
to villagers whose farmland would be occupied, and the cost would be 
shared by all villagers participating in the ZJGG project. The LDR that is 
required for using the selected farmland for housing construction comes 
from the LDR quota produced from housing land reduction. 
 Step 5: The township government would organize the construction of 
the NRC, allocation of housing, and relocation of villagers. While the con-
struction is straightforward, the allocation of new housing, which involves 
compensating for villagers’ demolished old housing, is another compli-
cated political task. The township government then needs to decide at 
what rate villagers’ old housing will be ‘traded-in’ to offset the price of 
new houses and at what price the new housing will be sold (a tiered pricing 
scheme is usually used). This valuation process is fraught with tension, as 
the government needs to negotiate with hundreds of families on whether 
and how the old housing’s age, size, condition, building materials, loca-
tion, and type of use will be included in the pricing of the trade-in value. 
 Step 6: It is only after the NRC has been built and villagers have relo-
cated when the reduction of housing land (i.e., the demolition of old 
housing, the process that really produces the LDR quota) can begin. In 
most cases, the demolition and farmland reclamation is outsourced to pro-
fessional companies. 
 Step 7: The municipal government inspects the housing land reduc-
tion and farmland reclamation. Only with its approval, the LDR released 
from the reclaimed farmland can then be granted a LDR quota ( zhibiao in 
Chinese), legally registered, and become a tradable  commodity. This com-
modity is fi nally created after all the seven steps have been completed, a 
process impossible without the institutional building and political involve-
ment of local governments. 
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 Step 8: While a ZJGG project ultimately connects rural households 
with urban land users, the real LDR trading happens between two county 
governments (typically one peri-urban on the demand side and one hin-
terland as the supplier), mediated by the municipal government. For this 
trading, the municipal government has set up another key institution, the 
Rural Property Rights Exchange (RPRE). The LDR quota is fi rst acquired 
by the Land Reserve and then listed on the RPRE for bidding. The LDR 
market is, therefore, both created and monopolized by state actors: LDR 
quota is approved by the municipal government, can only be bought and 
sold by the Municipal Land Reserve and RPRE, respectively, and only 
county governments can sell to and buy from them. 
 Step 9: Any county, according to its development needs, can bid for 
the LDR quota in auctions run by the RPRE. Detailed mechanisms of the 
bidding process will be discussed later. The municipal government can 
also do matchmaking between the supplying and buying counties in Step 
2 when the project is approved; but in most cases, the municipal govern-
ment has allowed the production of the LDR quota (i.e., Steps 1–7, the 
‘decrease’ part of ZJGG) and its sales (Steps 8–11, the ‘increase’ part) to 
be de-linked. 4 
 Step 10: Once the LDR quota is obtained, the county government 
can then carry out land requisition in its selected site to turn collectively 
owned farmland into state-owned land ready for urban development. 
Affected rural residents will need to be compensated. This is another 
confl ict- ridden process and violent confrontations caused by this type of 
land requisition are legions; Chengdu is no exception. 
 Step 11: Now the county government that has bought the LDR quota 
has turned a piece of farmland into state-owned urban construction land 
equipped with full development rights. Only as such, this piece of land 
can enter into the urban land market and be auctioned off to urban users, 
which can be any qualifi ed companies. 
 These 11 steps trace the fl ow of the LDR quota from its production 
through trading to its eventual use. The fl ow of fi nancial resources occurs 
in the reverse direction and in a different sequence. The Land Reserve 
fi rst advances funds to townships in Step 2. That loan will be repaid by the 
township in Step 9 when the LDR quota is sold on the RPRE. The funds 
that the peri-urban county uses to pay for the LDR quota in Step 9 must 
also be advanced by the county government from its budget, so are the 
funds for land requisition in Step 10. Those funds will be repaid after the 
sales of urban construction land in Step 11. Ultimately, it is the revenue 
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from Step 11 that pays for the LDR quota and the costs of producing it, 
which therefore constitutes a fi nancial transfer from the richer peri-urban 
counties (from the economic benefi ts it gains from urban developments) 
to poorer hinterland counties to fund public services provision there. This 
scheme of funding public services provision through a cross-county trans-
fer of the fi nancial benefi ts from urban development is equalizing, locally 
based, and more sustainable than the reliance on central fi scal transfer. 
 Figure  4.1 uses one example of a ZJGG project implemented across 
two counties (the peri-urban Shuangliu county and hinterland Qionglai 
county) to illustrate these two fl ows. The LDR quota (545 mu) was pro-
duced in the Longfeng Village of Qionglai county through demolition of 
Qionglai County
(hinterland)
Shuangliu County
(peri-urban)
The municipal
Land Reserve
Area of de-
construction in
Longfeng Village:
545 mu of farmland
reclaimed from housing
land
Net increase
of farmland in
Longfeng
Village: 11 mu
Area of NRC
construction in
Xinjie Village:
187 mu of farmland
converted to
housing land
Area of urban
development in Zhonghe
Town:
347 mu of rural land
requisitioned into urban
land; sold for ¥210
million. Cost of
land
requisition:
¥172 mil.
Payment for
LDR quota:
¥38 million.
Advance of
start-up loans:
¥38 million
Cost of de-
construction:
¥15 mil.
Investment in
NRC: ¥23
million.
 Fig. 4.1  Cross-county fl ows of LDR and fi nancial resources in a ZJGG project. 
 Notes :  Solid arrows represent fl ows of fi nancial payments and  transparent arrows 
represent fl ows of LDR quotas.  Hexagons indicate areas of land-use changes;  ovals 
indicate the amount of fi nancial transfers 
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old housing. The quota then went to three destinations: a token balance 
of 11 mu of increased new farmland in the same village, 187 mu was used 
for the construction of the NRC in another village in Qionglai, and fi nally, 
the biggest part, 347 mu was fi rst sold to the Land Reserve and then auc-
tioned off to Zhonghe Town in Shuangliu county for urban development 
there. With this LDR quota, Zhonghe Town was then able to transform 
347 mu of rural land into urban construction land and sold that to devel-
opers for 210 million yuan. The bulk of this revenue, 172 million yuan, 
was actually used to cover the cost of land requisition in Zhonghe Town. 
The rest, 38 million, had been paid earlier to the Land Reserve to acquire 
the LDR quota. This was also the amount which the Land Reserve had 
loaned to Qionglai County to pay for the costs of the LDR production. 
For Qionglai, the net gain was the 23 million yuan that was used to build 
the NRC in Xinjie village and provide public services there.
 Residential Reconstruction: Building ‘New Rural Communities’ 
 As the preceding discussion shows, the production of LDR in Chengdu is 
tied to the construction of NRCs and therefore always involves a recon-
struction of the rural residential settlement patterns that transforms the 
spatial dispersion of rural settlements into concentrated living. The spatial 
dispersion of rural settlements is particularly pronounced in the Chengdu 
Plain area due to both its fl at topography and history of recent immigra-
tion settlement (Skinner  2001 ). Clusters of a few houses in bamboo- or 
tree-shaded areas in the middle of farm fi elds created what is known as 
the  linpan landscape, a pattern of spatial fragmentation (Abramson and 
Qi  2011 ). The relocation of rural residents into NRCs is only one part 
of the municipal government’s three-pronged approach of rural restruc-
turing. The so-called ‘three concentrations’ ( sange jizhong ) program also 
involves concentrating rural industries in centralized developmental zones 
and concentrating farmland in scaled-up agriculture. 
 Through this residential reconstruction, rural settlements begin to con-
centrate in centralized housing sites—the NRCs—which almost without 
exception are built along a major road or around market towns, while 
the scattered settlement pattern and the  linpan landscape are gradually 
 dissolved. In these NRCs, residents from multiple natural villages within 
an administrative village now live in much greater density and closer prox-
imity to each other. This spatial transformation brings a major advantage 
to the provision of public services: public spending in one location—a new 
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NRC—can now reach a far greater population and an economy of scale 
can be achieved. 
 The municipal government imposes two requirements on these NRCs. 
First, in designing the communities and regulating the use of space in 
the communities, an urban-planning regime is adopted. These NRCs are 
modeled after an urban ideal of tightly regulated and homogeneous resi-
dential space and the spatial segregation of work and living. The goal here 
is not only to satisfy the practical needs of residents, but also to transform 
both the rural lifestyle and rural residents. 5 This urban-planning regime 
imposes a standardized appearance on all NRCs. With their brand new 
houses, landscaped greeneries, paved roads and abundance of public facili-
ties, these NRCs contrast sharply with the traditional villages, where many 
of the public facilities are absent and run-down single-story brick houses 
cluster amid farm fi elds. They bear far greater resemblance to gated com-
munities in the suburbs; in fact, the municipal government explicitly cited 
the British urban planner Ebenezer Howard’s concept of ‘garden city’ 
(Howard  1965 ) as an inspiration and template. 
 Second, and more important to this study, the municipal government 
requires that when any NRC is built, a standardized set of public services 
must be provided. The cost for providing these public services is already 
included into the price which the Land Reserve pays townships when it 
acquires the LDR quota produced by that township. In other words, in 
the transfer of the LDR quota from its producer (a township) to the Land 
Reserve, the price is not determined by market, but administratively set by 
the Land Reserve. 6 
 The replacement of market mechanisms with administrative command 
here makes a crucial difference to the provision of public services. A danger of 
direct LDR trading between local governments in a free-market fashion is that 
suppliers of the LDR quota, when their potential supply outstrips demand, 7 
would enter into a race to the bottom by continuously lowering their cost of 
the LDR-quota production. Alternatively, when demand surpasses supply and 
the rewards are high, local governments would then have incentives to create 
more supply, by force if necessary. Either way, in practice, this means forcing 
more rural residents to demolish their houses, relocating them into high-rise 
buildings, and minimizing compensation to rural residents and public service 
provision. All these are recipes for social contention and political resistance, as 
experiences in Shandong attest to (Long et al.  2012 ). 
 In place of scale control, as the central government intends to do, 
Chengdu chose to instead regulate the cost of LDR quota production. 
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This was done through two measures. First, the purchasing price of LDR 
quota was set by the Land Reserve, the only buyer in the market, to pre-
empt the competition among townships on the basis of price. Second, 
the price was set much higher than the costs of de-construction, reclama-
tion, relocation and new housing construction, but also covers costs of the 
mandated services provision in the NRCs. 
 When the ZJGG scheme was fi rst scaled up in 2008, the Land Reserve 
set the purchasing price at 150,000  yuan per  mu and mandated the 
provision of a package of 13 public services in NRCs; by the end of 
the three-year period, the price had risen to 300,000  yuan per  mu , and the 
mandated public services had increased to 21 items. The 21 items are the 
minimum required for rural communities in villages; for communities near 
the county seats or towns, the minimum is raised to 23 items. These public 
services include a comprehensive social service station, clinic, childcare 
center, library, convenience store, ATMs, public toilet, and connections of 
gas, electricity, water and sewage system. The LDR quota would only be 
granted (Step 7) after the NRC and its public service provision has passed 
the municipal government’s inspection. 
 Controlling Grassroots Governments and Enabling Public 
Participation 
 Chengdu government from the very beginning of the experiment made 
two critical choices that distinguished it from all other comparable cases. 
Besides mandating the provision of public services in NRCs and admin-
istratively setting the price for LDR quotas to cover the cost of services 
provision, the other choice is decentralizing the fi nancial benefi ts created 
by the LDR trading to its sub-units—county and township governments. 
If the fi rst created an effective mechanism of controlling local agents and 
preventing them from cutting corners on services provision, then the sec-
ond created strong incentives for them to implement ZJGG projects. For 
township governments, which nowadays are starved of discretionary fi scal 
resources, a ZJGG project brings in a huge fi scal transfer. These funds not 
only allow the township to transform its physical landscape and potentially 
draw in more non-farm businesses, which further generate fi scal revenues; 
more importantly, all these construction activities create profi t-making—
and even rent-seeking—opportunities for local offi cials—usually by direct-
ing businesses to their clients and relatives in the ‘shadow state’ (Smith 
 2010 ). 
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 Compared with Chengdu, in other pilot zones such as Tianjin, the 
provincial governments monopolized the land incremental value from 
LDR transfer. The production of the LDR quota was fi rst handed down to 
lower-level governments as an administrative task from the province, and 
once produced, the LDR quota was then centralized and allocated by the 
provincial government. This created at least two problems: fi rst, county 
governments had few incentives to implement the ZJGG program; and 
second, little of the incremental value was allocated to rural areas. 
 Once the incremental value is decentralized to county-level govern-
ments, another danger emerges: Since the valuable TDR quota can only 
be produced from reducing rural housing land, over-zealous local govern-
ments, now motivated by the fi nancial gains from TDR, will force such 
reduction to happen, which was what exactly took place in Shandong 
province, also one of the fi ve pilot provinces that started with the ZJGG 
experiment in 2006 (Long et  al.  2012 ). Therefore, the administrative 
price-setting and public service provision mandate is critically important 
for Chengdu to avoid this pitfall. Setting the LDR quota price artifi cially 
high created an equity-enhancing fi scal transfer; mandating public service 
provision precluded the misuse of the fi scal transfer. 
 In choosing these policies, the municipal government was primarily 
motivated by practical considerations: It needed a way to both discipline 
and motivate local governments to perform political functions of the state, 
and it did not need to foot the bill, as the funding came from end users. In 
2007, Chengdu also became the national pilot zone for rural–urban inte-
gration, which gave its leaders greater incentives to promote rural invest-
ment and use excellence in this area for political gains. 
 In recent years, the municipal government further enhanced spending 
on rural public services by allocating an annual cash budget of 200,000 
yuan to each administrative village, earmarked for public services provi-
sion. At the same time, a new mechanism of increasing public partici-
pation in decision-making regarding public services provision was set 
up. Aside from the village committee that already exists in every village, 
which, despite being democratically elected by all villagers, has mostly 
functioned as an executive branch offi ce of the township government, a 
new Democratic Deliberation Council ( minzhu yishihui ) is established in 
each village, its members all directly elected by villagers. One of the key 
functions of the Council is to determine the use of this new earmarked 
fund for public services provision. 
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 CONCLUSION 
 Chengdu’s experiment with LDR commodifi cation under the ZJGG 
framework has progressed successfully since 2008. By the end of 2013, the 
municipal government’s own statistics show that a total of 1839 ‘new rural 
communities’ are at various stages of construction, including 1219 already 
completed, all fi nanced by the sales of LDR quota under ZJGG projects. 
These 1839 communities involve a total of 307,064 rural households and 
987,496 rural residents. This means that this program has relocated over 
one fi fth of Chengdu’s total rural population (4.6 million in 2013) into 
newly constructed residential communities, where physical conditions and 
provision of public services are on par with urban areas, a big accom-
plishment in a context of long-standing severe rural–urban disparities. The 
fact that this all happened without major incidents of protests, petitions 
or violent confrontations is another rare achievement in today’s China. 
Participation in the program has remained voluntary, and in every village 
that relocated to a new community, we always met households who stood 
their grounds and refused to move. They faced efforts of persuasion and 
sometimes, social pressure, but never the use of violence. 
 At the same time, the LDR quota created from these rural relocations 
has allowed urban built-up areas, as well as the urban economy, to expand 
rapidly in the peripheral counties. Take the Economic Development Zone 
in Longquanyi county for example, Chengdu’s only national-level devel-
opment zone. Its size increased from 990 ha in 2008 to 6100 ha in 2013, 
with full legality thanks to the ZJGG practice. The development zone, all 
built on rural land, now houses nine major automakers and has become 
one of the largest bases of automobile industry in western China. 
 Chengdu’s experience contrasts sharply with stories of forceful evictions 
and violent confrontations that have been widely reported in the literature 
on land dispossession in China. Putting aside the shortcomings of that 
literature, we can still see that Chengdu’s differences with other localities 
are real. In fact, with the exception of Chengdu, on a national scale, the 
implementation of the ZJGG policy has caused widespread protests and 
violent resistance. Local policy innovations in Chengdu, we argue, caused 
this divergence. 
 Chengdu’s municipal government created market institutions to facili-
tate fi rst the commodifi cation of LDR and then its trading between coun-
ties that have unequal access to the benefi ts of urbanization. The LDR 
trading structured in this way created a de facto fi scal transfer from richer 
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peri-urban counties to poorer hinterland counties. Using two additional 
policy tools—administrative price setting to include in the LDR quota 
price the cost for NRC construction and a public services provision man-
date for LDR quota production—the municipal government further 
forced local governments at the county and township level to invest the 
fi nancial gain from LDR trading in public services provision. Through the 
combination of these innovative local policies, the Chengdu government 
successfully solved all three challenges to public services provision in rural 
areas: The LDR trading turns rural land into a fi nancial resource that can 
fund services provision, the NRCs transform the spatial dispersion of rural 
population and creates concentrated communities for easy service delivery, 
and fi nally, profi t decentralization, administrative price-setting and man-
dating public services provision create both incentives for local agents to 
implement the policy and constraints on their use of fi nancial resources. 
 Chengdu’s success in constructing NRCs is only possible as a result of a 
combination of local policy innovations and central political concessions. 
It is only in this unique policy context that rural reconstruction can be 
suffi ciently fi nanced by the commodifi cation of LDR. This should make 
it abundantly clear that the biggest challenge in any rural reconstruction 
program is the lack of such fi nancial resources. 
 In an informative article that vividly describes a case of rural recon-
struction in Jiangsu province, Bray (2013) introduces the Chinese central 
government’s ambitious plan, as a part of its ‘Building a New Socialist 
Countryside’ program, of extending urban planning to the countryside to 
help modernize and reconstruct rural areas. While Bray’s sensitivity to the 
tension between the discourse and practices of urban planning and rural 
spatiality and livelihoods is commendable, he gives undue signifi cance to 
the ‘state-sponsored urban planning regimes’ but overlooks the challenges 
of fi nancing rural reconstruction. Without fi nancial resources, the central 
government’s requirement that ‘every administrative village in China … 
to commission and implement a 20-year “master plan” for redevelopment’ 
(Bray 2013, 54) will only create useless paperwork. 8 In fact, most of the 
villages we have studied in southwestern China outside Chengdu are even 
too fi scally starved to hire urban planners to draw the useless paperwork. 
 Other studies of the ‘New Socialist Countryside’ programs have also 
over-optimistically assessed the program of physically transforming rural 
China when the only source of funding is central government’s fi scal trans-
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fer (Schubert and Ahlers  2012 ). In most places, such transfers are both too 
small and too loosely regulated, and the only physical transformation that 
took place in villages is façade painting along the road which upper-level 
inspection teams travel. 
 Only in places like Chengdu, where land commodifi cation provides suf-
fi cient funds earmarked for rural reconstruction, urban planning can have 
the legs to ‘go rural’. Even in Chengdu, the sustainability of this model 
depends on continued growth of the urban economy and the demands it 
creates for new construction land. In fact, during the three post-earthquake 
years, the municipal government had wanted to take advantage of the 
central concession and do a total overhaul of rural Chengdu by using the 
ZJGG policy to move all villages into NRCs. But the plan only proceeded 
to the degree today because of insuffi cient urban demand for construction 
land and, as a result, shortage of fund to fi nance rural reconstruction. 
 NOTES 
 1.  The fi rst national Land Use Master Plan was made in 1997, but soon revised 
in 2005; the current national Master Plan is in effect from 2006 to 2020. 
 2.  More specifi cally, the targets are to preserve 121.2 million ha farmland by 
2010 and 120.33 million ha by 2020, of which 104 million ha should be 
prime farmland.  Mu is the commonly used measure in China; one  mu 
equals one fi fteenth of a hectare. 
 3.  In China’s territorial administrative system, a county-level unit can be called 
variously as a county, an urban district and a municipality. Chengdu has nine 
districts, four municipalities and six counties. For simplicity sake, they will 
all be referred to as ‘counties’ in this paper. 
 4.  As mentioned earlier, this one-to-one linkage between de- construction and 
new construction is mandated by the MLR. Chengdu has devised a local 
policy (called the ‘Project of Constructing Concentrated Rural Housing’) 
to circumvent this restriction. 
 5.  See Bray (2013) for an insightful analysis of this process, which he calls 
‘urban planning goes rural’. 
 6.  This is different from the price that the Land Reserve sells the LDR quota 
to a peri-urban county. That price is determined by market mechanisms 
through auctions run by the RPRE. 
 7.  In any Chinese city, the urban fringe area typically has a far greater potential 
of reducing rural construction land than there is demand for new construc-
tion land, which tends to concentrate in the peripheral urban area. This is one 
of the reasons that the central government tried to limit the supply by impos-
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ing an annual ZJGG quota. But in Chengdu’s case during the three post-
earthquake years, such supply restriction was removed, and oversupply 
became a real possibility. 
 8.  China now still has 571,611 administrative villages (Long et al.  2012 ). If we 
use the new ‘rural community’ in Qionglai in Fig. 5 as the standard, which 
costs 20 million yuan just for housing construction and infrastructure build-
ing, to apply ‘urban planning’ to all villages in the entire country would cost 
an astronomical fi gure—over 11 trillion yuan. 
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